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ABSTRACT 
 
Operational events are normal occurrences in industrial plants and in nuclear power plants. The evaluat
ion of operational events gains importance when it comes specifically to nuclear power plants due to the proport
ions that the impact and the consequences of these events may cause to the installation itself, their workers, the 
external area of the nuclear installation, the environment and to the public in general. These consequences, for 
the operation of these facilities can range from very little, until the consequences that lead to accidents and can 
cause significant impacts. Operational events may be associated or have influence in many fields of knowledge, 
such as operation, maintenance, engineering, Radiological Protection, physical protection, chemistry, Human or 
Organizational Factors and external events, among others. The accident at the Fukushima Daichi nuclear power 
plant, shows the importance of exhausting all the studies concerning operational events in order to improve the 
operational safety of nuclear plants, considering all the causes and possible consequences. In this context, the ev
aluation of operational events discipline emerges as an important and relevant tool to contribute to the maintena
nce and/or improvement of the operational safety of nuclear installations. Not without reason the nuclear industr
y actively participates in programs of exchange of operational experience, where relevant events are thoroughly 
evaluated and discussed in specific forums, such as power plant operators, regulators and/or joint technical meet
ings, always with the purpose to prevent, minimize or mitigate its consequences. Any evaluation of operational 
events passes necessarily by an in-depth study of the circumstances of the event, culminating with the identifica
tion of your cause and proposition of corrective actions to prevent recurrence of similar events. Additionally, the 
events should not be studied individually, but evaluated within a temporal context in order to identify trends that 
might pass unnoticed. There are several methodologies for evaluation of operational events, specifically, for the 
determination of the causes of the event, where the concepts of root cause, direct cause and causal factors, amon
g others. However, the most recent methodology in use in Brazil, date of 2003. The subject is so important that t
here is national legislation dealing with the theme, also it need of update. The actual regulations establishes crite
ria for notification of the occurrence of events considered significant for safety and establishes criteria and deadl
ines for the issuance of the report. Is also discussed the relationship between occurrence of operational events an
d a potential application for the life extension of the nuclear power plants, considering the regulatory focus, the
me quite present in the international field. The present study intends to present a modern, appropriate methodolo
gy for evaluation of operational events, focusing on regulatory aspects and verify its applicability to nuclear po
wer plants. Will also be presented a study of the occurrence of events, focusing on the last five years of operatio
n. Finally will be also presented to international trends in development on this area. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Nuclear power plants (NPP) have the objective to produce electric energy using a nuclear 
reactor. There is a part of this installation called nuclear island, including a nuclear reactor of 
a pressurized water reactor (PWR) design, the primary system, safety and auxiliary systems. 
The other part is considered as a conventional thermal power plant including the secondary 
system, turbines and the main generator. These facilities have many similarities with 
conventional industries, especially the aerospace and petrochemical industry. Nuclear power 
plants have many components and items arranged in redundancies and systems. These 
systems in turn are directly responsible for production of electricity, divided into 
conventional and nuclear systems. They can also be classified as safety systems, support 
systems and other systems. The failure of a component or system, depending on their 
functions, can cause an interruption  in the production of electricity, an increase in risk during 
normal operation or under some fault condition, or even the occurrence of an incident or 
accident. The consequences of failure can range from a simple maintenance operation, to 
evacuate large areas around the facility. Similar to what occurs in the aerospace industry, the 
failures in this type of installation must be accompanied by extensive research and evaluation 
to understand what happened and take corrective action so that these failures are not repeated. 
A feature of the nuclear industry is the exchange of information that occurs between plants of 
different countries using this form of power generation. A major failure affects all nuclear 
industry. As an example, the worst accidents that have already occurred, the plants of TMI, 
Chernobyl and Fukushima. These accidents caused a very bad impact in the nuclear industry. 
 
This exchange of information occurs at various levels of technical cooperation and has been 
very effective and efficient in preventing failures. On the regulatory side the Brazilian 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (CNEN) develops activities in this area with the 
International Energy Agency Atomic (IAEA), through the International Report System (IRS) 
[7], which acts as national coordinator. This committee receives and disseminates through the 
internet, to authorized and registered persons, information on major events taking place in 
nuclear plants in the countries affiliated to IAEA. An annual general conference is held, 
where they are discussed in detail these events. The IRS system has a large database, which 
enables detailed queries in the area of operational events. In turn, Licensee, participate in 
groups such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and the Institute of 
Nuclear Power Operation (INPO), where this type of information exchange also takes place. 
The evaluation of operational events is a mandatory regulatory requirement and should be 
conducted systematically and consistently meeting the standard of CNEN [1]. 
 
The CNEN performs, through its audit program, verification of compliance with the 
regulatory requirements associated with the area of operational events. Furthermore, certain 
types of operational events classified by the standard [1], are reported and evaluated by 
CNEN in order to verify that the appropriate and necessary treatment is given to each 
important event for the operational safety. This theme is still treated specifically, every 10 
years during the Periodic Safety Reassessment (PSR) [18], where its regulatory approval is 
required for renewal of the Authorization for Permanent Operation (AOP). 
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In addition to audits of CNEN and internal audits of the Licensee, the area of operational 
events is still also verified by the IAEA, through various missions and services such as: 
Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) [15], Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation 
(SALTO) [17] and missions event evaluation type Low Level or Near Miss (PROSPER) [14]. 
 
Operational events may have different origins and contributors factors. Usually the correct 
term to identify why a failure occurred is called Root Cause Analysis. The determination of 
root cause may be more complex or simple depending on the significance of the event for 
safety, reliability and plant availability. Some methods include determining the direct and 
apparent cause. However, whatever the method, it is important to accurately determine the 
cause of a failure to prevent it happening again. 
 
External events should also be considered in the evaluation of operational events program. 
The use of external operating experience can have the benefit of discovering latent and 
potential failures that could have concerns for safety. The use of this events of external 
experience can bring consideration of aspects such as [7]: 
 
— Generic implications that apply to the plant; 
— Whether there is similar equipment at the plant; 
— Whether there are similar practices at the plant that predispose it to similar events; 
— The possible prior occurrence of a similar event; 
— Reported actions taken that are applicable to the plants 
 
The identification and determination of the root cause of operational event is considered a 
key part in the evaluation of operational events. Events with safety implications shall be 
investigated in accordance with their current or potential significance. Events with significant 
implications for safety shall be investigated to establish their direct and root causes, including 
causes related to equipment design, operation and maintenance, or to human and 
organizational factor. The level of the investigation carried out should be commensurate with 
the consequences of the event and the frequency of recurring event. 
 
The direct causes, root causes and causal factors of the event should be clearly described. The 
reasons for equipment malfunctions, problems of human performance, organizational 
weaknesses, design and manufacturing deficiencies and other relevant facts should be 
included under causes. Whenever appropriate the method used for cause analysis should be 
referenced in the report. [7]. 
 
The operating experience programme shall be periodically evaluated to determine its 
effectiveness and to identify any necessary improvements. A periodic review should be 
undertaken of all stages of the process for the feedback of the operational experience to 
ensure that all of its elements are performed effectively [7]. 
 
The IAEA has some relevant publications used in this paper, as best practices in: (a) 
Organization, management and Conduct of Investigation of Events [10], (b) 
Management of an Operating Experience Program [11] and (c) Identification, 
Reporting and Screening of Operating Experience in NPP [9]. 
 
Finally, this area becomes bigger and larger considering the Periodic Safety Review 
(PSR) [2, 18] and new licensing process of life extension or renewal [13]. This 
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extension of life beyond the 40 years initially authorized, may give the licensee an 
additional 20 years or more of operation, provided that regulatory requirements are 
met. In this sense, a good performance in the evaluation of operational events, along 
with safety indicators and the Maintenance Rule effective and efficient programs can 
contribute decisively to achieving this extension of life. 
 
There are several methodologies and references illustrating the evaluation of 
operational events. This is a discipline that is improving each year, based on 
experience gained over the years, the various types of power plants and the failures 
that occur in these plants. 
 
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY FOR EVENT EVALUATION  
 
 
2.1. Basic Structure 
 
For a review of operational events to be performed adequately, it is considered important to 
establish some initial conditions. First, it is necessary the existence of a dedicated team. The 
dimension of this team should be sized so that the objectives established in the event 
assessment methodology are properly executed and satisfied. Another important point is the 
training and qualification of this team. The methodology should establish a control of authors 
of operational events reports, the type of training they should receive and the frequency of 
these trainings. 
 
As a minimum, training should be established in (a) Determination of the root cause; (b) 
interviews and audits; (c) Classification in accordance with regulatory standards; (d) 
classification in the INES scale; (e) Determination of significance for the safety of faults 
occurred; (f) Aging and aspects of obsolescence; (g) Safety Culture; (h) Failure modes and 
Failure Effects and; (i) Detailed knowledge of the plant systems. At least one member of the 
assessment team of operational events must be a licensed operator. This qualification is 
considered extremely important, since a licensed operator has extensive operating knowledge 
and an overview of plant operation and can efficiently identify the consequences of 
operational failures. 
 
The whole methodology developed to deal with operational events should be established in 
written and controlled procedures in order to ensure the existence of specific knowledge 
management. 
 
 
2.2. Event Screening 
 
 
In a general matter operating events should be classified according to their importance to 
safety. The standard CNEN NN 1:14 [1] currently sets out nine criteria for the event 
classification in Chapter 6. (1) Events related to the Technical Specification [4,5]; (2) Events 
that cause degradation to the barriers against release of fission products; (3) Natural 
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Phenomena or external causes that may threaten the safety of the plant; (4) Any automatic 
actuation of the plant safety systems; (5) any event that could prevent the performing of a 
critical safety function; (6) common cause failures (7) radioactive gaseous release above the 
limits of the standard CNEN [3]; (8) radioactive effluent release above the limits of the 
standard CNEN [3]; and (9) any event or real threat to plant safety including fire. This 
classification was based on American Rule for operational events 10CFR50.73 [21] and the 
associated regulatory guide NUREG-1022 [23]. 
 
This classification has more than 10 years and clearly has room for improvement. There are 
important events for safety, not mentioned in the standard NN 1:14. They should be 
considered during the screening process for the preparation of research and generation of its 
operational event report. We can mention for example: (1) Emergency Plan initiators events  
[6] (not all initiators events currently generate operational event reports to meet the standard); 
(2) damage or leaks in pipes and pressure vessels or failure of passive systems; (3) release of 
liquid and gaseous, reaching values bellow the CNEN rule but significantly higher than the 
average; (4) failure of fire protection equipment; (5) failure of physical protection equipment; 
(6) lifting equipment failure or load-lifting or drop loads; (7) failures identified in civil 
structures; (8) Failure to control foreign material; (9) significant loss of response capacity to 
deal with transients and emergencies, as failure of control room instrumentation systems, 
alarms and / or communication; (10) unplanned reactor limitation system actuation, where 
applicable; (11) any event not rated in the previous items, but which are deemed important 
for operational safety; and (12) Significant events in the construction and commissioning 
phase. 
 
The Low Level and Near-misses operational events should be evaluated considering their 
importance to the safety. These events occur in large numbers in facilities but if they are not 
reported may become important initiating events. These events can be grouped into similar 
families in order to establish effective corrective actions to prevent become relevant 
operational events for operational safety [14]. 
 
 
2.3. Times and contents 
 
 
An operational event report  shall be issued and submitted to the regulatory body (CNEN). 
The standard NN 1.14 [1] stablishes the structure that a report of operational events must 
have typically an event report must contain at least, but not limited to: 
 
- The event title; 
- Date; 
- Event class; 
- Where appropriate the emergency class of Emergency Local Plan; 
- INES scale; 
- Summary of the event; 
- Plant conditions before and after the event; 
- Discover mode; 
- Conditions Operating Limits (CLOs) applicable; 
- Failure mode; 
- Root cause; 
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- Detailed description and research event 
- Operator actions 
- Evaluation of the consequences 
- Corrective actions, including deadlines and responsibilities 
- References to similar events, discussing where applicable, why previous corrective actions 
have not been efficient and effective to prevent the recurrence of events. 
 
The evaluation of operational events should be performed routinely, consistent and 
appropriat. It should be performed in a timely fashion, so that you can survey all the 
information needed to identify the root cause. The risk of carrying out an assessment of 
events to be held in a long time after the occurrence of the event is the loss of information 
that can often be critical to identify the root cause and prevent it from being classified as "non 
determined". The industry has been using a maximum 28 days [12] to perform a thorough 
investigation of an operational event. 
 
Some additional information are considered extremely relevant for safety, such as safety 
culture aspects involved, report updating where corrective action were not made on schedule, 
considering the effects on plant and safety and should be included in the reports. 
 
It should also be designed and used a database management system, so that all the events 
occurred at the plant can be recorded and consulted with agility at any time. Use of this 
database may allow identification of trends and recurring and similar events. 
 
 
2.4. Indicators and Assessment 
 
 
The structure established for the evaluation of operational events should also provide for the 
use of staff performance indicators, failure trend indicators and a self-assessment of the 
operation of this team. 
 
Typical operational events indicators should consider availability and reliability of safety 
systems, failure rates, automatic and manual reactor trip, automatic actuation of the reactor 
protection system or the reactor limitation system, forced reduction of power, systems and 
failure of equipment champions, failure modes, fault finding mode, the cause of faults 
(maintenance deficiencies or design, human error, aging degradation, deficiency of 
procedure, lack of adherence to procedures, problems spare parts, obsolescence , disability 
planning or control or other cause), and the area (operation, engineering, maintenance, 
organization, chemistry, and others). They should not be considered normal and acceptable 
reports with root causes classified as indeterminate or unknown. 
 
Performance indicators of typical operational events evaluation program should at least 
consider: (a) generating event report with exceeded deadlines, (b) event classification errors, 
(c) events with undetermined causes, (d) similar events, (e) events where the roots causes 
were not efficient to avoid recurrence, (f) corrective actions with expired deadlines, (g) 
corrective action within the schedule, (h) aspects involving safety culture and (i) deficiencies 
related to organizational factors 
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Each of the indicators mentioned above should be formally established in procedures, 
definitions, calculation method, data acquisition mode, acquisition times and generation of 
values and associated thresholds. 
 
The IAEA TECDOC 1141 [8], the US NUREG 1649 [22] and ARAUJO [24] present list of 
relevant safety indicators that can be used to perform this assessment.  
 
A screening of the external operating experience must also be performed. Should be 
considered as a minimum, but not limited to, operational events reported by: the IRS, the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC), by World Association of Nuclear Operators 
(WANO) and the German Reactor Safety Authority (GRS).  
 
A periodic assessment of external operational events should be performed, presenting the 
number of analyzed operational events and focusing those who directly or indirectly could 
affect the safety of the plant. 
 
An annual assessment must be generated, addressing the trend indicators and performance 
indicators of the evaluation program of operational events. For the report to be efficient and 
effective in improving the methodology, this report must be built throughout the year and 
should be available 30 days after the end of a cycle of operation (exchange of fuel elements); 
 
 
 
2.5. Root Cause Analysis 
 
 
Operational events should have a formal investigation. There are several types and techniques 
of research processes. These processes should be selected depending on the safety 
significance of operational event. 
 
The root cause should be considered the most fundamental the reason for an adverse event or 
condition that if not corrected could cause the event. Processes, tools or typical events of 
investigative techniques are [12]: 
 
- Interviewing; 
- Task Analysis; 
- Change Analysis; 
- Barrier Analysis (regulatory requirement); 
- Event and causal factor charting; 
- Cause and Effect Analysis; 
- Fault Tree analysis; 
- Event Tree Analysis; 
- 5W2H (Why, Who, When, What, Where and How and How Many); 
- Common Cause Analysis; 
- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); 
- Human Factor Investigation Tool; and 
- Psychological and Phisiological Evaluation. 
 
INAC 2015, São Paulo, SP, Brazil. 
 
The most used tools are the Barrier Analysis, Task Analysis and Change Analysis. A 
comprehensive method of these tools is described in the IAEA TECDOC-1756 [12]. A FMEA 
also is used and a description is described in  ARAUJO [25].  
 
Root cause mistakes or root cause non determined can result in many other events and 
ineffective corrective actions causing new similar events, spending a lot of resources. 
 
The IAEA presents a brief description of each one of these tools in the TECDOC 1756 [12]. 
The TECDOC also presents several recomendations to perform and conduct interviews. 
 
 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The operational investigation area is of the most importance and significance  area for the 
operational safety of nuclear power plants. This area is very large and multidisciplinary. It 
covers all areas involved with the operation of a nuclear plant. To be effective and efficient 
the assessment of operational events must be performed consistently and routinely. Reviews 
of operational events should be carried out fully and with high quality standards, so that all 
relevant issues at an operational event are answered and the relevant associated corrective 
actions are established, monitored and performed. Also the trends assessments can strongly 
contribute to reducing the number of operational events while maintaining a high degree of 
operational safety, reliability and availability. A good program to assess operational events 
can also reduce risks related to failure of operational events associated with failures  occurred 
as common causes, similar causes that could evolve to malfunction or even events associated 
with design basis accidents or events beyond design basis. 
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